The Philosophy of Ethics as It Relates to Capital Punishment by Warkoski, Nicole
Warkoski 1
The Philosophy of Ethics as It Relates to Capital Punishment 
Nicole Warkoski, Lynchburg College
The study of ethics as a whole, particularly in regard to philosophy, is composed of 
many nuances, which are the subject of disagreements between philosophers and those 
who study them. When the fundamental thoughts and theories of ethics are applied to the 
emotionally charged issues of today, the ethical debate takes on even more weight, creating 
an even more nuanced philosophical landscape. Take, for example, the debate regarding 
capital punishment: is such a form of punishment morally acceptable? Burton Leiser, who 
looks at the issue from a Kantian, retributive point of view, would argue that it is. Immanuel 
Kant, who discusses the philosophy of ethics in his work, Grounding for the Metaphysics of 
Morals (1785), argues in favor of the ideas of reason and "duty," under which heading he 
prescribes retribution as a form of justice for one's crimes. Hugo Adam Bedau, in contrast, 
argues from an inarguably utilitarian standpoint that it might not be. Utilitarian ethics is a 
method taken from John Stuart Mill, whose aptly named work, Utilitarianism (1863), 
recommends that—regardless of any idea of duty or justice—the consequences of any 
action should be examined fully in order to provide the greatest amount of good for the 
greatest number of people. Comparing the arguments presented by Burton Leiser (based on 
Kantian ethics) and Hugo Adam Bedau (based on utilitarian ethics) makes it clear that Bedau, 
who stands against the death penalty, presents a much stronger argument. By looking at the 
shared topics in each of the texts, particularly the idea of retribution, capital punishment as 
a deterrent, and the reality of an imperfect legal system, we might discover why the death 
penalty is, in fact, not necessarily morally permissible.
Leiser, who focuses much of his argument on the idea of retribution, begins his text
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by quoting Justice Potter Stewart, who upheld the death penalty in the Supreme Court. 
Leiser notes that the Justice said that "capital punishment 'is an expression of society's moral 
outrage at particularly offensive conduct,' and that even though this function may be 
unappealing to many, 'it is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal 
processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs,'" (688). Leiser then goes on to 
argue that, if the legal system does not continue to administer justice in this way, there will 
be an increase in so-called vigilante justice, in which citizens administer that justice to 
offenders without the support of the legal system. Leiser then develops the idea of human 
dignity, saying that "retributive justice does not deny the wrongdoer's worth and dignity. It 
assumes it, and makes no sense at all unless the wrongdoer is regarded as a human being 
capable of making his own decisions, acting upon his own volition, and deserving moral 
praise or blame for what he does" (690). He uses this notion to support the idea that capital 
punishment, in line with the Court's ruling, is not a form of cruel and unusual punishment, 
and thus is not against the Eighth Amendment or (as a result) unconstitutional.
The rest of Leiser's argument, as quoted in the text, is essentially his opinion on the 
nuances—on who should and who should not be subject to capital punishment—without 
very much evidence as to why he sets those distinctions in place, other than that the 
criminals who have committed serious crimes "deserve" it on grounds of retribution. He 
says this, or something like this, more than once: "Only the most heinous offenses against 
the state and against individual persons seem to deserve the ultimate penalty" (691), 
"Perpetrators of such crimes as genocide ... deserve a penalty no less severe than death" 
(691); "Treason, espionage, and sabotage, particularly during times of great danger (as in 
time of war), ought to be punishable by death" (692), and so on—this list is by no means 
exhaustive—until it seems he is merely listing the things he believes warrant capital
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punishment on the grounds of retribution. As a whole, Leiser constructs his argument 
without much (if any) distinction as to why these crimes are the worst, or any explanation as 
to what makes a murder "particularly vile, wanton, or malicious" (692), and thus deserving 
of the death penalty. His entire argument is based in the idea of retribution, and not much 
more.
Bedau, on the other hand, tackles the idea of retribution in his examination of capital 
punishment, while still leaving room to discuss other matters. For the sake of this essay, 
however, it makes sense to look at retribution first, because that is essentially the whole of 
Leiser's argument. Bedau, after examining this idea of retribution himself, effectively sums 
up the problem with Leiser's argument in a single sentence, saying "Some murders seem 
improperly punished by death at all; other murders would require methods of execution too 
horrible to inflict; in still other cases any possible execution is too deliberate and monstrous 
given the nature of the motivation culminating in the murder" (701). Essentially, Bedau 
argues that there are far too many small distinctions to be made between crimes, especially 
when dealing with human life, to effectively differentiate between them from an unbiased, 
purely retributive standpoint. (When Leiser tried to do this, for example, he merely made a 
list of things he found might warrant capital punishment; someone else's list could easily be 
very different from Leiser's.) Of course, the fact of these nuances does not ask us, the 
reader, to disregard the death penalty altogether; just because something is too difficult to 
feasibly accomplish does not make it immoral; it simply makes it illogical.
In fact, when looking at Bedau's argument as a whole, much of what he says does not 
seem to claim that capital punishment is immoral. Rather, he is pointing out the logical 
issues behind arguments that might try to claim that capital punishment is moral. Already,
he has pointed out the flaw in the argument of retribution; in addition, he takes on the idea
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of deterrence, claiming from the start that "in general, our knowledge about how penalties 
deter crimes and whether in fact they do—whom they deter, from which crimes, and under 
what conditions—is distressingly inexact" (695). More importantly, he notes another 
distinction that Leiser failed to even acknowledge in his argument: the possibility of 
imprisonment. After introducing this idea, Bedau points out that there is no way of knowing 
the level of effectiveness of the death sentence in regard to deterrence, and (perhaps more 
significantly) whether it is more effective at deterring criminals than life imprisonment. 
Where Leiser might argue that revoking capital punishment would see an increase in 
vigilante justice, Bedau points out that
Clinical psychologists have presented evidence to suggest that the death 
penalty actually incites some persons of unstable mind to murder others, 
either because they are afraid to take their own lives and hope society will 
punish them for murder by putting them to death, or because they fancy that 
they, too, are killing with justification, analogous to the justified killing 
involved in capital punishment. (696)
This explanation cements the notion that there is no way of knowing whether retiring the 
use of capital punishment is more likely to cause murders or prevent them. Bedau is not 
arguing that one outcome is more likely than the other, but his argument does render this 
idea of deterrence worth examination. The truth of the matter, as Bedau points out, is that 
we have no way of knowing whether deterrence is a legitimate defense of capital 
punishment, and thus both defenses—retribution and deterrence—have been called into 
question.
Leiser, on the other hand, simply takes these defenses for granted; the only time he 
acknowledges deterrence in his argument is when he says, "Arguing that the traditional
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justifications for capital punishment (deterrence and retribution) were sufficiently well 
founded" (691). The problem here, as Bedau points out, is that those justifications are not 
necessarily well founded. When these basic building blocks of Leiser's argument, deterrence 
and retribution, are challenged in the way that Bedau challenges them, the logic behind his 
argument falls apart. The authority he grants himself, by way of this logic, to choose who 
deserves the death penalty and who does not, no longer holds true, and Leiser's argument is 
rendered invalid.
Nevertheless, Bedau is not yet finished. As he wraps up his examination of the idea 
of deterrence, he alludes to yet another point. He says, "The most we can do is weigh the 
risk for the general public against the execution of those who are found guilty by an 
imperfect system of criminal justice" (697). Near the end of Bedau's argument, as quoted in 
the text, he revisits this extremely problematic factor in regard to capital punishment. He 
points out how much more likely it is that a black man, or an otherwise marginalized 
member of society, will be sentenced to the death penalty. While the definition of capital 
punishment, as it stands, does not imply that it will necessarily be more likely to affect the 
minority groups in society, it is nonetheless a reality in the United States that murderers who 
come from these groups are much more likely to be sentenced to death. As a result, it is not 
the worst of the worst that come to face death at the hands of the legal system, but just the 
most unfortunate of the worst. Bedau offers up many reasons that land a person in that 
predicament, almost all of them the result of poverty or marginalization. He lists everything 
from having a poor defense at trial and the lack of funds for an appeal, to being an 
immigrants or strangers in their community and members of a "despised" racial minority.
"In short," Bedau writes, "the actual study of why particular persons have been sentenced to 
death and executed does not show any careful winnowing of the worst from the bad" (698).
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After having disproven the ideas of deterrence and retribution, it is this idea that drives 
home Bedau's argument. Since the common defenses of capital punishment have been 
rendered weak under Bedau's examination, his issue of our imperfect legal system is enough 
to empower his argument when he states, "A system like this does not enhance respect for 
human life; it cheapens and degrades it. However heinous murder and other crimes are, the 
system of capital punishment does not compensate for or erase those crimes. It only tends 
to add new injuries of its own to the catalogue of our inhumanity to each other" (702).
In conclusion, Bedau's argument, on the whole, is much stronger and more effective 
than the one Leiser presents. Retribution and deterrence have for so long been used as 
defenses for capital punishment that Leiser sees it acceptable to use them without 
question—as his own defense, once again. Bedau, however, manages to dismantle these 
factors and display why they do not make sense, while simultaneously pointing out the 
reality that, on the contrary to what is portrayed by supporters of the issue, capital 
punishment is not a fair or equal way of administering justice in our society.
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